Burden of proof
The most well known “proof burden” is the burden of the prosecutor — but his burden is not tied to the reasonableness of his case. There is a reason to give the prosecutor the burden, but this reason is not tied to the facts or the reasonableness of his case. If this is the model for what a proof burden is, then we cannot get from “In the dispute between p and ~p, p has the proof burden” to “prior to argument (or if the argument is deadlocked), ~p is reasonable to accept”. This would be like saying “prior to the trial, or before we know anything about the case, it is reasonable to believe the defendant”- which is clearly not true. If I walk in on a courtroom procedure, or if it is my first minute on the jury, I don’t think that the defendant’s case is more reasonable, even though I recognize that that he does not have the burden of proof.
Fortunately, in genuine theological debate, burden of proof rests on the claimant making a claim, whether that claim is for or against the existence of God.
Still, it’s amusing how often one sees self-styled champions of reason hide behind their irrational application of the idea of a proof burden, thinking all the while that their own claims are somehow the more correct for not being subject to same (if only in their own view).
(Here’s hoping James won’t mind that I quoted his entire post!)
