Reader Mail: Ensoulment
A reader writes:
Here’s a question I was asked yesterday, regarding human cloning.
(Please answer using traditional theological terms and definitions.)
What if a human is cloned — is their rational soul cloned too? Because if the rational soul is spirit, and spirit has no parts, how can a rational soul be divided? Does God put a new rational soul into the cloned human? With cloning how would ensoulment work?
For instance, if we clone an animal, both would have irrational souls, but is it the same irrational soul — split?
In cloning do we force God into ensoulment?
To the best of my knowledge, and then unlike some other religions (notably, Islam), the Church has never concretely defined at what stage of development ensoulment occurs at; it’s left as an open question. See the Declaration on Procured Abortion from the CDF:
“19. This declaration expressly leaves aside the question of the moment when the spiritual soul is infused. There is not a unanimous tradition on this point and authors are as yet in disagreement. For some it dates from the first instant; for others it could not at least precede nidation. It is not within the competence of science to decide between these views, because the existence of an immortal soul is not a question in its field. It is a philosophical problem from which our moral affirmation remains independent for two reasons: (1) supposing a belated animation, there is still nothing less than a human life, preparing for and calling for a soul in which the nature received from parents is completed, (2) on the other hand, it suffices that this presence of the soul be probable (and one can never prove the contrary) in order that the taking of life involve accepting the risk of killing a man, not only waiting for, but already in possession of his soul.”
Notice especially the second point — the embryo at every stage of development must be treated as though ensouled, precisely because the lack of concrete knowledge concerning the moment of ensoulment means we cannot be certain, ever, whether the destruction of that embryo would destroy a human person already possessed of an immortal soul.
Now, the question was about clones, and not embryos, but the excursis is still a relevant one; clones also begin from an embryonic state, as do naturally conceived human beings.
Now let us go on another excursis.
Wikipedia is not a reliable source by any means, but its article on cloning makes an interesting point that I think is relevant here:
“Human cloning is the creation of a genetically identical copy of an existing or previously existing human. The term is generally used to refer to artificial human cloning; human clones in the form of identical twins are commonplace, with their cloning occurring during the natural process of reproduction.”
Now, granted, that clause may have been inserted in order to reflect a progressive, pro-cloning bias; this is Wikipedia, after all. But even so, it makes an interesting point; identical twins are, in a sense, clones of each other, in that they both derive from a single fertilized egg and so are essentially 100% genetically identical. And yet nobody would think to make the claim that identical twins share a soul divided between them — each has his or her own unique rational soul.
To answer one of the questions posed — if a human is cloned, is their rational soul cloned too? — directly, I could simply say “no.” The cloning of a human being does not mean that the rational soul is cloned, anymore than my own daughter inherited a portion of my soul and a portion of her mother’s soul by the act of being conceived, nor any more than identical twins share halves of a single original soul. The rational soul, being spirit, is extrinsic to the genetic information of the ensouled person, and is likewise extrinsic to the material components of said same person. And the rational soul is bestowed to each person in a way that is not regulated or in any way limited by their material and genetic makeup.
Cloning, therefore, does not divide the rational soul of the cloned person; the embryo resulting from the cloning would receive a “new” soul (so to speak) at whichever point in the development of an embryo ensoulment typically occurs. Each bodily distinct human being possesses his or her own unique rational soul…even a cloned human being.
For the sake of completeness, the same could be said of the irrational souls of animals; these too are extrinsic to the material and genetic makeup of the cloned animal, so it would be the case that a cloned animal would still be possessed of a unique irrational soul.
Now, the last question — in cloning do we force God into ensoulment? — is interesting, because I wonder at the spirit in which it was asked. The answer must be delivered with caution — a “yes” answer could serve as a springboard into a question about whether there is actually a limit to God’s knowledge (and therefore power), while a “no” answer could serve as a springboard into a question about how something which God can anticipate beforehand can still be considered immoral. It may also be the case that the question was asked devoid of any such agendas, but one can never be certain.
As it happens, I think the “no” answer is correct; God is not “forced” into ensouling a new human being resulting from cloning, any more than He would be “forced” into ensouling a new human being resulting from sexual intercourse. But I don’t think it’s just enough to say that much; the answer must be understood in the context of the grave immorality of the act of cloning, and must be further understood (as is the case with all theological matters) in light of tag Incarnation.
God was not “forced” into sending us His Son to be our Saviour, even though it was necessary that Christ suffer and die. This is a paradox and a mystery, and our best understanding of it would be to call it a gift undeserved (for that is what it is, in fact). In the case of cloning, and the ensoulment of clones, it is not the case that God is forced to make a soul He did not expect to make, but it is the case that He does not withhold the gift of a soul — and therefore the possibility of salvation — from a human being who is conceived by immoral means.
This could perhaps be likened to the ensoulment of children conceived through sexual liasons that fall outside the lines of what the Church teaches is moral in regard to sexuality; “illegitimate” children are ensouled even though the sexual act that led to their conception was itself immoral. In like manner, human clones are ensouled even though the procreative act that led to their conception was itself immoral. And as is the case for illegitimate children, the rational soul God bestows is not a soul God had not anticipated the need for, but is rather a gift God bestows in spite of the non-ideal means by which the human being receiving the soul came into existence.
One further note: A corollary of the idea that the soul — like salvation itself — is a gift (and then one completely undeserved) is that God is not obliged to bestow a soul on a cloned human being, or indeed on any human being. That He does so is a testament only to His love for us, for the soul is bestowed only out of undying and endless love rather than out of any sense of duty or obligation.
Which, I submit, makes it that much sweeter, and all the more precious.
