A fyne olde English nayme
Mohammed, that is.
As in: “Mohammed has become the most common name for baby boys born in London and in three other English regions.”
As in: “In the capital, the Islamic name — including its varient spellings — was twice as popular as the second-placed name, Daniel, in 2008.”
The key point one can immediately extract from this is that there is something amiss with the birthrate amongst the indigenous English population (that would be the Brits proper, just for reference). Only about 2.97% of England’s population is actually Muslim, which translates to about 1.5 million people according to 2005 census data. The percentage and quantity have both likely increased measurably in the four years since then, but the point is that Muslims still constitute a very small portion of the population of England, especially when compared to between 45 and 47 million native Britons, Irish, Scots, and Welsh.
London’s demographics are a bit different than the rest of the country: approximately 8.5% of its population identify as Muslim, which would translate to about 640,000 people in a city of 7.5 million. Approximately 5.4 million Londoners are British or Irish-born (Scottish and Welsh populations in the city are evidently not statistically significant).
5.4 million compared to 0.64 million? It shouldn’t be hard for the 5.4 million to, shall we say, outproduce the 0.64 million, should it? And yet, the opposite is evidently the case, or is close enough to being the case that the name of Islam’s prophet has become the number one most common name given to baby boys in London. And in three other cities.
Which in turn leads us to a discussion of birthrates proper. What kind of birthrate does a demographic group with an 8.5% share of a region’s population actually need to overtake the birthrate of a demographic group with a whopping 72% share of that same region’s population? Mark Steyn’s observations about Europe’s deathbed demographics and the attendant vulnerability for those flagging cultures to be overwhelmed by certain fecund minority groups in their midst continues to gain both relevance and evidence.
The question should be asked whether this significant statistical change is a portent of anything more dire. I think it is, and to the good reader would like to put a question: to what extent is the character of a nation dependent on the character, nature, values, and “face” of its populace? If the character, nature, values, and “face” of that populace shift, over some period of time, will the character of the nation likewise shift? And if so, will the shift necessarily have a positive outcome?
(hat tip)
